Category: DSB&C Insights

A Guide to Post-Judgment Collection in Massachusetts

As post-judgement collection varies state-by-state, knowing how and when you can collect in your state is paramount. This post will tackle post-judgments in Massachusetts. Judgments in Massachusetts are valid for twenty (20) years from the date of issuance. At the end of the 20-year period, there is a presumption that the debt has been satisfied. However, if the debt is still owed at the end of twenty (20) years, a judgment creditor may move the Court to extend the judgment.

The first step following the issuance of a judgment in a creditor’s favor is to request the original execution from the Court. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 235, § 17, an execution on a judgment cannot be issued by the Court as a matter of right more than one (1) year after the judgment issues. If a creditor fails to timely request the execution, the creditor will have to file a motion for the issuance of an execution which is at the discretion of the Judge hearing the motion, but subject to the “level of process and judicial scrutiny commensurate with our motion practice.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bernier, 50 Mass.App.Ct. 756 (2001). See also, M.G.L. c. 235, § 19.

In the event a Court has already approved a real estate attachment in favor of the creditor that was recorded in the Registry of Deeds, the resulting execution must be recorded within thirty (30) days of its issuance in order for the execution to date back to the attachment’s lien position. If the original execution is lost, the creditor can move for the issuance of an alias execution in order to pursue collection remedies. M.G.L. c. 235, § 17.

An original execution is needed to take any of the following post-collection actions: (1) record and/or levy against any real property owned by the defendants; (2) to file a supplementary process action to obtain an order for payment from the Court; (3) a bank attachment and/or wage garnishment; and/or (4) to domesticate your judgment in a foreign jurisdiction.

After a creditor has paid all of the amounts owing under the judgment, including interest at a rate of 12% per year, the original execution must be returned to the Court as satisfied within ten (10) days pursuant to M.G.L. c. 235, § 17. If the Execution is not available for return, a party can file a discharge of judgment in its place, but it should also be filed within ten (10) days of satisfaction of the judgment and execution.

Business Records or Inadmissible Hearsay? The Incident Report

Business records prepared in anticipation of litigation serve a crucial role in helping businesses prepare for potential legal challenges, protect their interests, and comply with legal requirements. These records are essential for evidence preservation, legal strategy development, and risk management in the face of future legal disputes or regulatory investigations. The primary purpose is to prepare the business for potential legal challenges by gathering relevant information, documents, and evidence. Documents that might be traditionally hearsay can be offered into evidence at trial if the proponent can meet the requirements as a Business Record Exception to Florida’s hearsay rule. “Florida’s business-records exception appears in section 90.803(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).” Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952, 956 (Fla. 2008). “To secure admissibility under this exception, the proponent must show that (1) the record was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was a regular practice of that business to make such a record.” Id. Additionally: [T]he proponent is required to present this information in one of three formats.

First, the proponent may take the traditional route, which requires that a records custodian take the stand and testify under oath to the predicate requirements. See § 90.803(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Second, the parties may stipulate to the admissibility of a document as a business record. Third and finally, since July 1, 2003, the proponent has been able to establish the business-records predicate through a certification or declaration that complies with sections 90.803(6)(c) and 90.902(11), Florida Statutes (2004).” Id. at 956-57.

The Business Record exception to the hearsay rule offers parties an “easy way,” to admit documents such as accounting statements, balance sheets, income statements, transaction logs,copies of contracts, agreements, and other legally binding documents related to business operations, partnerships, or transactions, emails, letters, memos, internal investigations, or incident reports. Via the testimony of a records’ custodian at trial, and so long as the proponent of such evidence lays the proper statutory predicate, a business record may be admitted at trial without the necessity of locating and producing the author of the statement itself.

By anticipating litigation, businesses can take steps to protect their interests, ensure compliance with legal requirements, and minimize potential liabilities. Incident reports are often created to gather and document information related to a loss. They help preserve important details, evidence, and witness statements about an occurrence, whether the litigation ensues or not. Incident reports provide detailed accounts of what happened, including dates, times, and – if we are really lucky – admissions by those responsible for the loss.

But is it really that simple? Can an attorney admit an incident report into evidence even if it qualifies under the Business Record Exception to the hearsay rule?

Incident reports are generally NOT admissible, even if they meet the requirements of Florida’s hearsay rule. See Stambor v. One Hundred Seventy-Second Collins Corp., 465 So.2d 1296, 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (“[I]t is plain that the accident report which was prepared solely in anticipation of litigation was not admissible in evidence. It constituted, without dispute, hearsay evidence and was not admissible, as urged, under the business records exception to the hearsay rule”). Accident reports and incident reports “show lack of trustworthiness” because such a report is “made solely for litigation purposes to help defend against a claim which might arise from the accident.” Id. Also see e.g. Butcher v. Miami Elevator Co., Inc., 568 So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“damaging statements attributed to the plaintiff by unidentified sources–contained in three letter-reports prepared by a former employee of the condominium’s management company and sent to the insurer–as to how the accident occurred, were inadmissible hearsay”); King v. Auto Supply of Jupiter, Inc., 917 So.2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 2006) (citing Stambor, supra, and stating, “[t]he facts there showed that the manager prepared the report solely for the purpose of defending the restaurant from a litigation claim by a patron who was injured while on the restaurant’s premises. Because it was not the regular practice of the restaurant’s business activity to make such a report, the court properly concluded the report was inadmissible hearsay for lack of trustworthiness”).

Despite an attorney’s best efforts, a Court can refuse to admit an Incident Report because of a lack of trustworthiness despite distinguishing the relevant case law. Whether or not such a report is prepared as the regular practice of a business activity is strictly scrutinized and interpreted by Courts, and judges are often reluctant to make even a questionable ruling that could result in an issue on appeal.

So, what is the bottom line? What is an attorney to do when faced with this unenviable position at trial? Preparation and planning are key to trial practice, and trials aren’t always won in the courtroom. A strong civil attorney must analyze incident reports at the beginning of litigation with the assumption that the report itself will be excluded. Therefore, the best witness to prepare in this regard is not a records’ custodian, but the author of the document. He or she will become the best witness to the incident – not the report about it.

There was an Easement Around Here Somewhere

Easements, what are they and how does Florida law categorize them? An easement generally provides the right to use another person’s land for a specific purpose. It is a nonpossessory interest, as it is only the “use” of the land, and not the ownership of the land. If the original purpose of the easement has been frustrated, it may not exist except for in name only. When determining if an easement exists, it is critical to review the language of the suspected easement and the purpose of that easement.

An easement can be an Express Easement, an Implied Easement, an Easement of Necessity, Easement in Gross, a Solar Easement, or a Prescriptive Easement. “An express easement must be interpreted by looking at what the original parties and their successors in title intended, which is manifested by both the circumstances and the actions and statements of those parties.”¹ Florida courts treat easements as they do contracts, meaning the plain language should be applied if it is unambiguous. If the language is unambiguous, then the court looks no further than to the language to ascertain the intent of the parties. Express easements are sold or given to a neighboring estate. It is created by an easement agreement in writing between the two estate holders, typically contained within the warranty deed, or it can be created by a court order. A “Person granting easement may restrict easement in any way he [or she] wishes, and easement holder cannot expand easement beyond that contemplated at the time it was granted.”²

There are at least two parties to an easement, the Dominant Estate and the Servient Estate. The Dominant Estate is the beneficiary of the easement, the party that can use the easement and the Servient Estate is the estate that owns the easement or the party where the easement is being used. A unity of title between the Dominant and Servient Estates could frustrate the original purpose of the easement, and therefore, even though the language still exists on the face of the warranty deed, the easement is really just fiction.

Common-Law and Statutory Easements – Chapter §704.01

Florida Statue §704.01 describes a common-law easement that is created by a common grantor of property who grants a piece of land to another party so that it creates a landlocked parcel of land. The grantor, at one time, must have owned both the servient and the dominant properties. Accordingly, a party seeking to establish a common law way of necessity under subsection (1) must establish the following elements:

1. That, at one time, both properties were once owned by the same party;
2. That a common grantor conveyed the landlocked parcel, thereby causing the need for an easement; and
3. That, at the time the landlocked parcel was conveyed, the grantor’s remaining land had access to a public road.³

“In Cirelli, the court explained that, “[b]ecause a common law way of necessity required a common source of title between the dominant and servient parcels, it became obvious that this requirement could not be met in all instances and many parcels of property would remain landlocked. Therefore, the legislature enacted §704.01(2) to provide relief in those instances in which a common law way of necessity could not be obtained.”

“A statutory way of necessity does not require a common source of title and is dependent upon the existence of numerous factors that are not necessary to the creation of a common law way of necessity. Moreover, public policy rather than legal fiction (the presumed intent of the parties) is the basic foundation for statutory ways of necessity.” Id. The court went also took note that “§704.01(2) serves the legitimate public purpose of allowing access to landlocked property so that it may be transformed from useless and unproductive land into valuable and productive property that provides a residence to the owner or produces valuable raw materials such as timber or agricultural products,” as well as the positive effects of development promotion and increased tax revenues. See id.

The Cirelli decision enumerated the following elements necessary to establish a statutory way of necessity under §704.01(2):

1. The claimant’s property is landlocked by property belonging to others;
2. There is not a practicable route of ingress or egress to the nearest public or private road;
3. There is no common law way of necessity under §704.01(1) because there is no unity of title between the landlocked and adjoining tracts;
4. The landlocked property is situated outside a municipality (which is no longer applicable under the current version of the statute);
5. The landlocked property is being used or the owner desires to use the property as a dwelling or for agricultural, timber raising or cutting or stock raising purposes; and
6. The statutory way of necessity sought over the adjoining parcel is the “nearest practicable route” of access.⁴

Additionally, §704.02, under statutory easements, requires compensation to the servient property holder, otherwise the taking would violate the State and Federal Constitution: “No private property shall be taken “except (i) for a public purpose and (ii) and with full compensation therefore paid to each owner. This is called eminent domain. The public purpose is to provide a lawful means by which to accomplish full utilization of the state’s natural resources, their development in the ordinary channels of commerce and industry.”⁵ The existence of the statutory easement would be judicially determined, and the amount of compensation awarded is determined by a jury pursuant to Florida statute.

You also can claim an easement if it is a public road. A road becomes dedicated to public use under either common law dedication or statutory dedication. Common law dedication requires proof of the following:

1. An intention by the landowner to dedicate the property to public use and
2. An acceptance by the public.⁶

Proof of the intention to dedicate and of the acceptance must be clear and unequivocal, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming the dedication.⁷ Requirements for a statutory dedication are contained in § 95.361(1), Fla. Stat. This section provides that if a road constructed by a municipality has been maintained or repaired continuously for four years by the municipality, the road shall be deemed dedicated to the public, and title to the road will vest in the municipality, “if it is a municipal street or road.”

Temporary Construction Easements

Sometimes an easement is needed on a temporary basis simply to allow contractors access to a piece of private property for a specific purpose. These are known as Temporary Construction Easements (“TCE”). An example of this is when a government entity requires access across private property due to a public road expanding. The private property owner is entitled to just compensation even though the taking is only temporary. If the government and the private property owner are not able to resolve the terms of the TCE, the governmental agency can file an eminent domain lawsuit in compliance with the State and Federal Constitution. The TCE only remains as long as is necessary for the project to be completed. It is critical to specifically identify the terms of the TCE so that all parties are aware of the following: 1. The amount and type of compensation, 2. The duration and scope of the TCE, and 3. The party’s obligations for restoration, damages, or violations of the original terms of the TCE.

When dealing with an easement issue, the most important thing to remember is that each easement is handled differently depending on the property and obtaining an opinion from an attorney who deals with easements on a daily basis should give you the peace of mind moving forward.

¹ Condron v. Arey, 165 So.3d 51 (5th DCA, 2015).
² Star Island Associates v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 433 So.2d 998 (2nd DCA, 1983).
³ Matthews v. Quarles, 504 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
⁴ Cirelli v. Ent, 885 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), citing Boyd v. Walker, 776 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), and Ganey v. Byrd, 393 So. 2d 652 (Fla 1st DCA 1980).
⁵ Stein v. Darby, 126 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).
⁶ Bishop v. Nussbaum, 175 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
⁷ Roe v. Kendrick, 146 Fla. 119, 200 So. 394 (1941).

Did ChatGPT Pass the Bar Exam?

Did ChatGPT Pass the Bar Exam? Learn more about the relationship of AI technology and law from the experts at DSB&C.

The State of the Statute of Repose in the State of New York

New York is famous for not having a Statute of Repose of any sort. For the purposes of this discussion, a Statute of Repose bars a claim against design professionals and contractors after passage of a certain amount of time from project completion. This is different than a Statute of Limitations, which sets a deadline to commence a lawsuit measured from the time of the loss or injury. The rationale behind the Statute of Repose is to allow design professionals and contractors to put a project to rest, at some point. For example, if doors are jammed 25 years after construction, the owner should not be able to make a claim against those that did the design and construction of the entire building. New York and Vermont are the only two states remaining with no Statute of Repose.

Under the current law in New York, contractors and design professionals are exposed to claims for personal injury and property damage resulting from construction defects for an unlimited number of years after a project is completed. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) Section 214-d is sometimes referred to as the mini-Statute of Repose. Section 214-d requires wrongful death, personal injury, and property damage claimants to serve design professionals with a written notice of claim, at least ninety days prior to commencement of a lawsuit, when the design or construction work was completed more than ten years prior to the date of the claim. Failure to serve the notice sets the stage for a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(h) or CPLR § 3212(i). If the defendant can show that more than ten years have passed since the project was completed, and no notice was served, the case will be dismissed. See, Dorst v. The Eggers Partnership, 265 A.D.2d 294, 696 N.Y.S.2d 478 (2 Dept. 1999). This mini “Statute of Repose” is something of a joke. Among other things, even if a claim is dismissed for failure to serve the ninety-day notice, all that the claimant needs to do is serve the notice and start a new action.

New York is revered to be the financial capital of the world, as well as a center of art, fashion, music, theater, media, innovation, and progress. As the law is currently written, design professionals and contractors in New York are subject to claims for an indefinite period of time. After 10 years a claimant must serve a notice, but this could be 20, 30, 50, or more years after the project is completed. This creates a lot of uncertainty for design professionals and contractors and their liability insurers. This must be balanced against the need and expectation by building owners and the public that buildings remain safe and usable structures beyond the 10 years or less that most other states have adopted for their statute of repose.¹

The design and construction communities in New York have been lobbying for a Statute of Repose for many years, and now there are bills pending in the New York State Assembly and Senate to repeal CPLR § 214-d in its current form and replace it with a 10-year Statute of Repose for personal injury, wrongful death, and property damage claims asserted against design and construction professionals. In this regard, the Assembly’s Standing Committee on Higher Education and the Senate’s Judiciary Committee, each have been considering a bill (Assembly Bill A3595² and Senate Bill S41272³) to impose a limitations period of ten years after the completion of improvements to real property. The bill has had no action for more than a year. A primary motivating factor for the bill, cited by the New York Legislature, is that the purpose of the bill is to curb the continuing rise in insurance premiums by bringing certainty to the scope of post-operational risk to which design professionals and contractors are exposed. In an effort to be fair, each bill provides for a one-year extension to serve a notice of claim, which accrues during the tenth year after the completion of the improvements.

In New York, and even more so in New York City, buildings are expected to last 50 or more years. We do not want the facades of 20-year-old buildings falling to the sidewalk with no recourse to the designers and builders responsible for the failure. We do not want a fire sprinkler main line to fail causing millions of dollars in property damage and endangering the lives of thousands of people.

¹A table of the various statutes of repose in the 50 United States can be found here

²The text of the proposed Assembly Bill can be found here

³The text of the proposed Senate Bill can be found here

Waiving Consequential Damages – The Struggle Continues

Consequential damages waiver clauses are found in almost all standard construction industry contracts. Not surprisingly, parties want to avoid the economic impacts of unforeseen consequences. Yet all too often, we find ourselves litigating over the enforceability of consequential damages waivers because the confusion about these clauses is so widespread. Why are these boilerplate standard waivers so problematic? The two main reasons are: 1) nobody can agree on what consequential damages are; and 2) the consequential damages waivers are often ambiguous.

So, what exactly are consequential damages? The term seems pretty straight forward, but if you’ve been an attorney long enough, you know that very little is black and white. We are experts at navigating gray areas, and, as if to recognize the need for guidance, Florida courts provided us with a roadmap to assist us in analyzing damages by dividing them into 3 categories: general, special, and consequential.

General Damages

General damages are those which naturally flow or result from the injuries alleged. They are commonly defined as those damages that are the direct, natural, logical, and necessary consequences of the injury. For example, let’s say Bob hires Joe to repair his AC unit and pays Joe $3,000 in exchange for Joe’s performance of the repair. If Joe breaches the contract by failing to repair the AC unit, Joe owes $3,000 to Bob in general damages.

Special Damages

Special damages are monies that will compensate a plaintiff for damages that do not normally result from a breach. To recover special damages, the plaintiff must prove that when the parties made the contract, the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the special circumstances leading up to such damages. They consist of items of loss that are peculiar to the party against whom the breach was committed and would not be expected to occur regularly to others in similar circumstances. Let’s take things a little further in our example above with Bob and Joe. Bob told Joe that he needed his AC unit to be repaired because his grandmother who lives out of state planned to visit him next week and could not stay at his home if the AC was not working. Joe told Bob the repair would be simple and could be completed in a few hours on Monday morning. Monday morning just so happened to be the day that Bob’s grandmother was to arrive. Joe breached the contract by failing to perform the repair, and Bob had to pay for his grandmother to stay in a hotel during her visit. The cost of Bob’s grandmother’s hotel stay would be considered special damages because the loss is peculiar to Bob and his circumstances.

Consequential Damages

The distinction between consequential damages and general damages lies in the loss incurred by the non-breaching party in its dealings with third parties. “Consequential damages do not arise within the scope of the parties’ transaction, but rather stem from foreseeable losses incurred by the non-breaching party in its dealings, often with third-parties, such as costs of repair.” In Keystone Airpark Authority v. Pipeline Contractors, Inc, 266 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), the First District relied on several cases throughout the country that illustrated the differences between consequential damages and general damages. In Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc., 468 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), the First District found that the cost to repair extensive termite damage to a home purchased after a termite inspection company erroneously certified that the home was free of damage constituted consequential damages, whereas the cost of the termite inspection constituted actual damages. The Eastern District of Virginia found that a property owner’s cost to correct structural defects that resulted from defective plans prepared by an architect constituted consequential damages. The Eastern District of Virginia also found that the cost to repair a leaking roof caused by an architect’s defective plans constituted consequential damages. While the differences among the three categories of damages may not be clear cut, Keystone provides a general framework that serves as a helpful guide.

How can a consequential damages waiver clause be ambiguous? Florida Courts allow parties to limit their remedies, including their liability for consequential damages so long as the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. Courts have found consequential damages waiver clauses to be ambiguous and unenforceable when the clause’s language was unclear as to the circumstances to which it applied.

Take the following example:

“Owner releases, and agrees that Contractor will not be held liable for any damages to the premises, nor for loss or damage, consequential, incidental or direct, including but not limited to any: theft, vandalism, wind; storm, rain, fire, flood; lightning strikes, force majeures; owner’s moving, eating or rental expense or income; disruption of services including utilities. In the event that any work performed by Contractor is wholly or partially destroyed or damaged due to theft, vandalism; wind; storm; rain; fire; flood; lightning strikes; force majeure or any other causes not under Contractor’s control, the loss shall be sustained by Owner and shall not be the responsibility of the Contractor.”

The contractor will argue that this waiver clause deals with two aspects of damages; 1) damage to the premises; and 2) damages to the contractor’s work. The first sentence arguably means that the contractor is not liable for any damages to the premises, regardless of whether those damages are considered direct or consequential and regardless of the source. The second sentence deals with damage to the contractor’s work and provides that the Owner will be responsible for the loss if the work is damaged by circumstances outside the contractor’s control. The owner, however, will argue that the waiver is ambiguous and contradicts itself.

Owner on the other hand, will argue that there is a direct conflict between the first and second sentence because the first sentence absolves the contractor from liability for damages to the property, while the second only absolves the contractor from liability in the event the damages to the premises are outside of contractor’s control, and that the “premises” arguably includes the contractors’ work.

Another example is:

“The Consultant and Owner waive consequential damages for claims, disputes, or other matters in questing arising out of or relating got this Agreement. This mutual waiver is applicable, without limitation, to all consequential damages due to either party’s termination of This Agreement.”

While this clause from the outset may appear to bar the Owner’s consequential damages claims against the consultant in a potential breach of contract claim, the second sentence calls into question the applicability of the waiver. The second sentence could be interpreted to mean that the only consequential damages that are waived are those that arise following termination. The clause’s ambiguity runs the risk of rendering it unenforceable.

You can avoid the consequential damages waiver pitfalls by: 1) educating yourself on what consequential damages are; 2) drafting well written clauses that are not potentially self-contradictory nor open to multiple interpretations; and 3) listing out the damages that are being waived, i.e. lost profits, increased labor and material costs, rental expenses, loss of use, etc. Acquiring a deeper knowledge and understanding of what consequential damages are will allow you to better draft an enforceable consequential damages waiver clause for your client’s benefit.

[1] Hardwick Properties, Inc. v. Newbern, 711 So.2d 35, 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) quoting Hutchinson v. Tompkins, 259 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1972)

[1] Keystone Airpark Authority v. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. 266 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) citing to Fla. Power Corp v. Zenith Indus. Co 377 So.2d 203, 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)

[1] Hardwick Properties, Inc. v. Newbern, 711 So.2d 35, 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) citing to Jonson v. Monsanto Co, 303 N.W. 2d 86 (N.D. 1981)

[1] Keystone Airpark Authority v. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. 266 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 1^st DCA 2019)

[1] Keystone Airpark Authority v. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. 266 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) citing to Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc. 468 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) and to Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am Insurance Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d. 1229, 1240 (N.D. Fla. 2012)

[1] Keystone Airpark Authority v. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. 266 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) citing to Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Wright 392 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (E.D. Va 1975)

[1] Keystone Airpark Authority v. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. 266 So.3d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) citing to McCloskey & Co., Inc. v. Wright, 363 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Va. 1973)

[1] Amoco Oil, Co. v. Gomez, 125 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D. Fla. 2000)

[1] Orkin v. Montango, 359 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).